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Abstract. The Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) model offers provable 
safety for vehicle behaviors such as minimum safe following distance. However, 
handling worst-case variability and uncertainty may significantly lower vehicle 
permissiveness, and in some situations safety cannot be guaranteed. Digging 
deeper into Newtonian mechanics, we identify complications that result from 
considering vehicle status, road geometry and environmental parameters. An es-
pecially challenging situation occurs if these parameters change during the course 
of a collision avoidance maneuver such as hard braking. As part of our analysis, 
we expand the original RSS following distance equation to account for edge cases 
involving potential collisions mid-way through a braking process.  
We additionally propose a Micro-Operational Design Domain (μODD) ap-
proach to subdividing the operational space as a way of improving permissive-
ness. Confining probabilistic aspects of safety to μODD transitions permits prov-
ing safety (when possible) under the assumption that the system has transitioned 
to the correct μODD for the situation. Each μODD can additionally be used to 
encode system fault responses, take credit for advisory information (e.g., from 
vehicle-to-vehicle communication), and anticipate likely emergent situations. 
Keywords: Autonomous vehicle safety, RSS, operational design domain 
1 Introduction 
The Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) model proposes a way to prove the safety 
of self-driving vehicles [Shalev-Shwartz17]. The RSS approach is currently deployed 
in Intel/Mobileye's test fleet of fully automated vehicles. Application areas of RSS in-
clude both fully autonomous vehicles and driver assistance systems.  This paper reports 
results of an ongoing joint project to externally validate and further improve RSS. 
A salient feature of RSS is the use of Newtonian mechanics to specify behavioral 
constraints such as determining safe following distance to avoid collisions even when 
other vehicles make extreme maneuvers such as hard braking. Employing RSS as safety 
checking logic requires not only knowledge of the physics of the situation, but also 
correct measurements to feed into the RSS equations. 
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We consider an example of applying RSS rules to a longitudinal following distance 
scenario involving the vehicle under consideration (often called the ego vehicle) as a 
follower behind a lead vehicle. To put RSS into practice, the ego vehicle requires at 
least some knowledge of the physical parameters fed into the physics equations, includ-
ing ego vehicle and lead vehicle status, road geometry, and operational environment. 
However, proving guaranteed safety via that approach is complicated by variability and 
uncertainty. Also worrisome are environmental situations that can transition the system 
into an unsafe situation even though each vehicle was following RSS safety rules. 
This paper identifies the implications for these issues in applying RSS to real vehi-
cles. Additionally, it proposes a new following distance equation to encompass edge 
cases that were out of scope for the original RSS analysis. 
A significant finding is that variability and uncertainty in the operational conditions 
introduce significant challenges for ensuring safety while maintaining acceptable per-
missiveness. (The permissiveness of a system is how free it is to operate without vio-
lating safety constraints [Guiochet08].) Variability is especially problematic because of 
the large potential dynamic range of driving conditions. For example, the difference 
between safe following distance on an icy hill compared to flat dry pavement means 
that a one-size-fits-all worst case approach to safe following distance is unlikely to re-
sult in a vehicle people will actually want to use. This paper seeks to identify the issues 
that must be resolved to use the RSS equations in a way that provides provable safety 
to the maximum degree practicable. 
In considering how to solve challenges arising from variability and uncertainty we 
avoid an approach of feeding statistical distributions through the RSS equations. That 
is because such an approach, as well as other probabilistic analysis approaches (e.g., 
[Laugier11]) could negate much of the benefit of having a formally provable aspect of 
safety. By the same token, arbitrarily bounding values to “worst” cases that are only 
probabilistically true simply buries the problem. 
Instead, we separate stochastic aspects of the system into a mode transition approach 
among Operational Design Domain (ODD) [NHTSA17] segments. Each strictly 
bounded Micro-ODD (μODD) region can be proven safe. Uncertainty manifests as the 
probability that the μODD selected actually encompasses the current real-world opera-
tional environment. This supports a Bayesian approach to selecting a context-dependent 
operational posture to maximize permissiveness while supporting cautious behavior in 
higher risk situations. Further, it allows for an extended range of operational conditions, 
including behavioral responses to fault scenarios and behavioral responses that take 
advantage of potentially better knowledge such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication. 
2 Related Work 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) have made large strides in improving 
automotive safety, especially in mitigating the risk of rear end collisions. Autonomous 
Emergency Braking (AEB) can now fully stop a vehicle in many lower-speed situations 
[ADAC13].  Beyond AEB, vehicles may offer driver assistance technologies including 
a safe distance warning [ADAC13]. Technologies have differing availability depending 
Autonomous Vehicles Meet the Physical World (Expanded)    3 
on speed and manufacturer [Hulshof13]. Test protocols generally select a few speed 
combinations representative of urban and highway driving [Hulshof13] in controlled 
conditions. Moreover, it is typical for current ADAS systems to used fixed rules of 
thumb (e.g., the two-second following rule as used by [Fairclough97]) for establishing 
operational safety envelopes that while potentially improving safety on average can 
either be to conservative or too optimistic. This paper takes a broader approach that 
considers the specifics of the vehicles involved and environmental conditions. We are 
not aware of other work that considers expanding physics-based safety analysis such as 
RSS to consider environmental conditions and vehicle performance characteristics. 
 Concern about covering all operational conditions is included in upcoming vehicle 
standards. The Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF) standard treats the uni-
verse as partitioned into four scenario sets: known safe, known unsafe, unknown safe, 
and unknown unsafe [SOTIF17]. The goal is to maximize the known safe area by min-
imizing the known unsafe area and discovering as many new unsafe scenarios as pos-
sible with a given level of effort [SOTIF17]. RSS with the μODD approach can help 
formalize and enlarge the known safe set while achieving acceptable permissiveness. 
Another approach to ensuring autonomy safety is to explain the behavior of control 
systems. For neural networks, new techniques offer the ability to visualize activations 
[Yosinski15], and offer various ways to reconstruct an image based on network activa-
tions and features [Mahendran16]. Proposals use various names for competency ex-
pression, such as communicating self-confidence in a task [Sweet16], or cognitive au-
tonomy where an autonomy system should possess “reasoning where it can introspect 
about its own reasoning limitations and capacity” [Mani18]. While these approaches 
might eventually be widely deployed, an RSS-like approach can use a safety envelope 
approach to ensure safety even if autonomy components have not been fully validated. 
To eventually reach Full Driving Automation Level 5 [SAE18] (or even highly per-
missive Level 4 capabilities), vehicles will need to seamlessly cover a wide range of 
driving scenarios and environmental conditions. Current work in support of this goal 
includes taking an ontology-based approach to categorizing driving scenes (e.g., in the 
PEGASUS project [Bagschik18]). While a run-time vehicle safety checker can benefit 
from such an ontology, it is additionally helpful to concentrate design effort on the most 
important scenarios while under-approximating ideal permissiveness for uncommon 
scenarios to reduce complexity and cost. The RSS model combined with the μODD 
approach present a strategy for covering the range of operational conditions plus poten-
tial for guiding test point selection based on μODD boundaries that might differ from 
collected design scenarios and functionality test plans. A specific strength of our ap-
proach is that it provides a way to handle “unknowns,” including uncertainty as to 
which scene is actually present in the external world, gaps in the driving scene ontology, 
and what to do when the vehicle is forcibly thrown out of its ODD by external events. 
Work on characterizing and dealing with perception uncertainty in the context of 
safety critical systems is still developing. [Czarnecki18] provides a model of factors 
that influence development and operational uncertainty. 
Safe state analysis is a theme for autonomous vehicle path planning. Path planning 
algorithms may consider the safety of the current state and reachable states in order to 
plan a path, including making predictions about potentially occluded obstacles 
4    Koopman, Osyk & Weast      
[Orzechowski18]. Such approaches tend to suffer from probabilistic limitations on their 
ability to provide deterministic safety, whereas the RSS approach to safety aspires to 
provide a deterministic model for safety. The μODD approach additionally examines 
the problem of improving the permissiveness of a deterministic safety checking func-
tion in the face of variability and uncertainty about the environment. 
We base our analysis on an initial RSS paper [Shalev-Shwartz17], and are aware of 
a follow up paper [Shalev-Shwartz18]. Interest in the performance aspect of RSS con-
tinues to grow, with a model and analysis of traffic throughput presented in [Mattas19] 
comparing RSS to human drivers under various values for the RSS parameters.  We are 
not aware of other published analyses of RSS equations for correctness and complete-
ness. 
3 RSS Overview 
3.1 The RSS Following Distance Equation 
In an RSS leader/follower scenario, the follower vehicle is presumed to be responsible 
for ensuring a safe longitudinal distance, so we assume that the ego vehicle is the fol-
lower. For this situation, RSS uses a safety principle of: “keep a safe distance from the 
car in front of you, so that if it will brake abruptly you will be able to stop in time.” 
[Shalev-Shwartz17] Figure 1 shows a notional vehicle geometry: 
 
 
Figure 1. Reference vehicle geometry for leader/follower. 
This yields a minimum following distance (id., Lemma 2): 
𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �0, �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 + 12  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌2 + �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟+ 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎�2 2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓22𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 ��   (1) 
 
Where in our case the ego vehicle is the following (“rear”) vehicle, and: 
• d'min is the minimum following distance between the two vehicles for RSS 
• vf is the longitudinal velocity of the lead (“front”) vehicle 
• vr is the longitudinal velocity of the following (“rear”) vehicle 
• ρ  is the response time delay before the ego (rear) vehicle starts braking 
• amax,brake is the maximum braking capability of the front vehicle 
• amax,accel is the maximum acceleration of the ego (rear) vehicle 
• amin,brake is the minimum braking capability of the ego (rear) vehicle 
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The d’min equation considers a leading vehicle, going at initial speed vf, which exe-
cutes a panic stop at maximum possible braking force amax,brake. The ego following ve-
hicle traveling at vr is initially no closer than distance d’min. In the worst case, the ego 
vehicle is accelerating at amax,accel when the lead vehicle starts braking. There is a re-
sponse time ρ during which the ego vehicle is still accelerating. Then the ego vehicle 
detects the lead vehicle braking and reacts by panic braking with deceleration of at least 
amin,brake. RSS considers the worst case scenario to be a highly capable lead vehicle with 
high amax,brake followed by an ego vehicle that brakes at an initially lower braking capa-
bility of at least amin,brake. A poorly braking follower requires additional distance to ac-
commodate its inability to stop quickly. 
While a derivation based on comparative stopping distances confirmed the equation, 
the modeling for Figure 4 (discussed later) and analysis using Ptolemy II [PtolemyII] 
revealed edge cases beyond the scope of the analysis in [Shalev-Shwartz17]. (Addi-
tional RSS braking profile information is provided by [Shalev-Shwartz18].) Specifi-
cally, Eqn. 1 does not detect situations in which the two vehicle positions overlap in 
space during – but not at the end of – the braking response scenario.  
As a thought experiment, consider an ego vehicle with good brakes that has matched 
speeds with a leader of significantly worse braking ability. Eqn. 1 is derived assuming 
the minimum vehicle separation occurs at the final rest positions. If the rear vehicle has 
superior braking, it could mathematically be “ahead” of the lead vehicle at some time 
during braking, yet still have a final rest position “behind” the lead vehicle due to 
shorter stopping distance. In reality, this is a crash. Thus, an additional constraint is that 
the rear vehicle must remain behind the lead vehicle at all points in time. 
A related scenario is a rear vehicle approaching with high relative velocity and su-
perior braking. The rear vehicle might collide during the interval in which both vehicles 
are braking, while still having a computed stopping point behind the lead vehicle. 
To address these situations, we break the analysis up into two parts based on the 
situation at the time of a collision if following distance is violated: (1) impact during 
response time ρ and (2) impact after ρ but before or simultaneous with the rear vehicle 
stopping. (Impact is no longer possible after the rear vehicle stops for this scenario.) 
Accounting for situation (1) requires computing the distance change during the re-
sponse time ρ. There are two cases. The first is when the front vehicle stops before ρ, 
and the second is when the front vehicle stops at or after ρ. 
Situation (2) has two parts. First, compute the distance change during ρ: 
𝑑𝑑′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = (𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓)𝜌𝜌 + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝜌𝜌22  (2) 
Next, solve for the distance between the two vehicles after ρ as a function of time: 
𝑑𝑑′′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟2 2  
−  ��𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓22 �           (3) 
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This is a parametric equation involving the time after the response time for both 
vehicles: tr ant tf. The minimum distance will occur at time tr=tf=t when both vehicles 
have equal speed (with the value of t then substituted into Eqn. 3 for evaluation): 
𝑡𝑡 =  (𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟0 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0) + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝜌𝜌
�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎�       (4) 
The special case minimum following distance is the sum of d’min and d’’min, and only 
holds when the rear vehicle is faster than the front vehicle at the end of the response 
time and the rear vehicle can brake better than the front vehicle:             𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, (𝑑𝑑′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑑𝑑′′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)]  ;  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚            ;  𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)             (5) 
Because amax,accel is likely to be of secondary importance for small ρ, we focus the bal-
ance of our discussion on braking. However, similar issues apply to acceleration. 
3.2 Coefficient of Friction 
Implicit in the RSS equations is that the maximum frictional force exerted by the vehi-
cle on the ground limits braking ability ([Walker08] pg. 119): 
 Ffriction = μ * Fnormal                                                                         (6) 
where: 
• Ffriction is the force of friction exerted by the tires against the roadway 
• μ is the coefficient of friction, which can vary for each tire 
• Fnormal is the force with which the vehicle presses itself onto the road surface 
The friction coefficient is a property of both the tires and the road surface. It is im-
portant to note that μ can be above 1.0 for some materials ([Walker08] pg. 119), so a 
rigorous proof cannot assume limited μ without placing constraints upon installed tires.  
3.3 The Normal Force and Road Slope 
The normal force on each tire is a property of the vehicle weight, weight distribution, 
the effects of suspension, the slope of the road, and so on. The normal force is the 
weight of the vehicle multiplied by the cosine of the road slope, shown by Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2:  Vehicle forces on an inclined roadway. 
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In this situation, braking ability is potentially limited by the reduced normal force. 
Moreover, gravity is pulling the vehicle down the hill, acting against and further reduc-
ing the net braking force ([Walker08] pg. 102). If μ is low, the net force can result in 
the vehicle sliding down the hill (either forwards or backwards) if the brakes cannot 
overcome the gravitational downhill force vector. Transverse road slope (camber) can 
similarly reduce Fnormal, but at least does not affect vehicle speed directly. 
3.4 Road Curvature 
An additional limitation to braking capability is that the centripetal force exerted by a 
vehicle to make turns must be provided by Ffriction ([Walker08] pg. 128). The net vehicle 
acceleration (both radial and linear) is a result of a force vector applied by the tire con-
tact patches to the road surface. It follows that any force used to curve the vehicle tra-
jectory steals available force from the ability to stop the vehicle by requiring a force 
vector that is at off-axis from the vehicle’s direction of travel. That means that if the 
ego vehicle is in a tight turn it will have trouble braking effectively. Lane positioning 
and racing line techniques [Kapania16] add additional complexity. 
A banked curve complicates analysis even further, involving potential increases or 
decreases to Fnormal depending upon whether the bank (superelevation) is tilted toward 
or away from the center of the curve. Secondary factors such as vehicle suspension, tire 
deformation, transfer of momentum to road debris such as gravel, and so on add addi-
tional layers of complexity to any attempted analysis. 
4 Uncertainty and Variability 
While Newtonian Mechanics provides us the tools to determine following distance in 
principle, even a simplified equation setup for a vehicle’s maximum stopping distance 
on a downhill corkscrew turn is worthy of a college Physics final exam. But in the real 
world we don’t actually know the precise values of all the variables in the equations. 
An important issue with proving safety in a cyber-physical system is that there is 
inherent uncertainty in sensor measurements. That uncertainty includes both issues of 
accuracy (how close the measurement is to the actual value being measured) and pre-
cision (what the distribution of errors in the measurement is across multiple measure-
ments). Uncertainty can additionally be characterized as aleatory uncertainty (e.g., sen-
sor noise that causes non-zero precision), and epistemic uncertainty (e.g., inaccurate 
measurements and incorrect modeling of the environment) [Chen18]. Both types of un-
certainty impair the ability to formally prove safety for a real-world system. 
The mere existence of a probability distribution for aleatory uncertainty impairs the 
ability to create a perfect proof. In principle any series of data points might, with some 
probability, be wildly inaccurate. Data filtering and statistical techniques might im-
prove the situation, but in the end there is always some non-zero (if infinitesimal) prob-
ability that a string of outlier data samples will cause a mishap. Over-sampling to drive 
that uncertainty below life-critical confidence thresholds (e.g., failure rate of 10-9/hr) 
could be impracticable due to the fast time constants required for vehicle control. 
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For epistemic uncertainty, a significant problem is providing a completely accurate 
model of the environment and the vehicle. Moreover, even if limitations on sensors and 
potential correlated sensor failures are mitigated through the use of high-definition 
maps, variability of operational environments is a significant issue.  
Uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated in the real world, so the question is 
how to account for it within the RSS model while keeping the system practical and 
affordable. In support of that, we consider sources of uncertainty and variability.  
4.1 Other Vehicle Parameters 
Ensuring that the ego vehicle avoids colliding with other vehicles requires understand-
ing the state of those other vehicles. Knowing where they are and where they are going 
requires other vehicle pose and kinematic information: {position, orientation, speed, 
acceleration, curvature} in addition to a prediction of how that information is going to 
change in the near future (e.g., path plan). That information will be imperfect. 
In the absence of perfect information, RSS simply assumes that distance is known 
and that the lead vehicle will immediately execute a panic braking maneuver at amax,brake. 
While in an ideal world all vehicles have a predetermined and consistent amax,brake, in 
the current world not all vehicles are thus equipped. However, even if new vehicles are 
standardized, braking capability can increase further due to factors such as after-market 
brake upgrades, after-market tire upgrades, low tire pressure, after-market aerodynamic 
modifications, and even driver leg strength. While a vehicle might be equipped with a 
feature that intentionally limits maximum deceleration, too strict a limit would extend 
stopping distance and increase collision rates in other situations such as single car 
crashes. 
If the ego vehicle wants to optimize following distance based on the actual lead ve-
hicle capabilities, it will need a way to determine what those are. Most vehicles are not 
designed to brake above 1g, but it is likely this limit is not universal on public roads. In 
other words, an assumption of any particular limit for maximum braking capability 
might be true most of the time, but perhaps not all the time. 
4.2 Ego Vehicle Parameters 
While knowing the exact state of the lead vehicle is difficult, it is also important to 
appreciate that knowing the state of the ego vehicle is also difficult. Many of the pa-
rameters that affect the lead vehicle also affect the ego vehicle, although the concern in 
this case is more about unexpectedly reduced braking ability. Some factors that might 
reduce braking capability below expectations include: 
• Transient equipment degradation: brake fade due to overheating, brake wetness 
(e.g., due to puddle splash), cold tire temperature, etc. 
• Equipment condition: brake wear, brake actuator damage, low tire tread depth, 
high tire pressure, etc. 
• System interactions: interactions between braking system and electronic stabil-
ity control, effect of anti-lock braking features, etc. 
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4.3 Environmental Parameters 
Successfully executing an aggressive braking maneuver involves not only the vehicle, 
but also the environment. While environmental conditions in a road segment might be 
reasonably well known via a local weather service (which becomes safety critical as 
soon as it is relied upon for this purpose), average values might differ substantially from 
the instantaneous environmental conditions relevant to a braking maneuver. After all, 
it is not the average road conditions over a kilometer of road that matter, but rather the 
specific road conditions that apply to paths of the set of tire contact patches of each 
vehicle during the course of a panic stop maneuver. Relevant factors that could result 
in a faster-than-expected lead vehicle braking maneuver combined with a slower-than-
expected ego vehicle braking maneuver due to differences on the roadway include: 
• Road surface friction: road surface, temperature, wetness, iciness, texture (e.g., 
milled ridges that increase traction; bumps that cause loss of tire contact), etc. 
• Road geometry: slope, banking, camber, curvature as previously discussed 
• Other conditions: hydroplaning, mudslides, flooding, high winds pushing 
against a high profile vehicle body, road debris, potholes, road buckling, etc. 
While the two vehicles will traverse the same stretch of roadway for some braking 
time, their contact patches are not necessarily going to follow exactly the same paths. 
Localized tire track road conditions can result in different stopping ability even if we 
attempt to measure some average value of μ. Consider, for example, a lead vehicle that 
brakes hard in snowy weather on a cleared tire path while the following ego vehicle 
gets caught slightly laterally displaced from the tracks with its tires on ice. 
One may suggest selecting conservative values for these assumptions so as to pro-
vide a safety buffer in the estimations. While this may indeed reduce the risk of a crash, 
our goal is to optimize the permissiveness of the automated driving system to maximize 
usefulness and infrastructure utilization. Overly conservative values to protect against 
an incorrect assumption could result in an automated vehicle that may be safe, but may 
also be quite annoying on the road due to excessively timid vehicle operation. 
4.4 Potential Assumption-Violating Actions 
Even if we know the values for all the variables, there are assumptions made by the 
RSS longitudinal safety guarantees and stated scope limitations that might be violated 
by real world situations. Examples include: 
• Lead vehicle does not involuntarily move backwards (e.g., due to an icy hill 
[YouTube17a]; this situation is generally covered by the safe longitudinal dis-
tance opposite direction case in RSS [Shalev-Shwartz17].)  
• Lead vehicle does not violate the assumed maximum braking deceleration limit 
(e.g., due to impact with a large boulder that suddenly falls onto the road). 
• Roadway μ does not unexpectedly change (e.g., flash ice-over, or a cargo spill 
such as a slime eel spill [YouTube17b]).  
• Ego vehicle does not fall below minimum expected braking capability (e.g., due 
to brake fade, puddle splashes onto brake rotor). 
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• There are no significant equipment failures (e.g., catastrophic brake failure of 
ego vehicle during a panic braking event). 
• There are no unusual vehicle maneuvers (e.g., cut-in scenarios in which a vehi-
cle suddenly appears too close; cut-out scenarios in which the lead vehicle 
swerves to reveal a much slower, too-close new lead vehicle [EuroNCAP17]). 
4.5 Effects of Uncertainty and Variability 
The concept of an ODD generally corresponds to the notion of the intended operational 
environment of a vehicle. While it is sometimes equated to a notion of geo-fencing, the 
dimensions of an ODD are numerous and varied [Koopman19]. As the scope of a 
planned deployment grows, the cross-product of all possible values for all possible as-
pects of the ODD suffers a combinatorial explosion, and taking a global worst case can 
get very pessimistic indeed. 
To illustrate how bad a global worst case might be, consider a steep valley with roads 
covered in ice near the valley bottom. The ego vehicle starts a descent on dry pavement, 
then hits ice halfway down a steep grade, sliding all the way to the bottom with no 
ability to stop. Meanwhile, the lead vehicle has already slid down the hill and back up 
the other side with essentially no ability to stop. The ego vehicle had left a large fol-
lowing distance – which in the end was insufficient due to the lead vehicle sliding back-
ward down the far side of the valley to collide with the ego vehicle at the bottom. 
Perhaps this sounds extreme. But cars and even trucks do in fact slide backwards 
down icy hills on occasion. The point is that most of the time the world is not displaying 
worst case conditions. It is highly desirable to exploit favorable cases to optimize per-
formance while still making allowances for the worst case. Leaving a kilometer follow-
ing distance between cars to handle a worst case icy hill is unlikely to be tolerated by 
other road users on a warm summer day. 
5 Dealing with Uncertainty and Variability in RSS 
In the end, uncertainty can’t be eliminated in a system operating in the real world. Ra-
ther, we recommend embracing the uncertainty by sandboxing formal proofs of safety 
into defined μODD segments. Uncertainties regarding the system can then be taken 
care of by a mechanism for selecting which μODD is currently active. 
5.1 A Divide-and-Conquer Strategy 
We propose dividing the ODD for a vehicle deployment into numerous different μODD 
regions, with each μODD being selected to have a useful bound on various parameters 
relevant to RSS safety. For example, some μODDs will correspond to icy road surfaces 
with steep hills, and others to dry pavement on flat ground. Each μODD can then be 
evaluated for the worst case following distance required for that region’s bounded pa-
rameters rather than for all possible values of parameters across the entire ODD. 
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While it might seem at first glance that a mathematic approach using bounded ranges 
of values would suffice, μODDs have two additional advantages. The first is that each 
segment can be mapped onto a concrete validation test that physically exercises the 
mathematically computed worst case within each μODD’s bounds. (This might or 
might not correspond to an ontology-based test used for functional validation, depend-
ing upon the μODD approach taken.)  This can directly tie simulation and physical 
testing to the underlying representation of safety enforcement. 
The second advantage is that μODDs can encode not only geographic location and 
weather, but also other aspects of the situation including the set of obstacles and events 
that are expected to be encountered, set of own-vehicle maneuvers that will be inten-
tionally performed, and faults that are expected (e.g., as listed in [Koopman19]).  
As shown in Figure 3, all possible system states within the ODD must be accounted 
for, with RSS used to compute a safety envelope for each μODD. Areas outside the 
defined ODD can be designated as one or more defensive regions in which the vehicle 
does its best to remain safe despite having been forced out of its defined overall ODD. 
In most cases the defensive μODD would invoke a safe maneuvering behavior such as 
bring the vehicle to a stop. However, some μODDs could also be designed to invoke 
more specific safing behaviors for pre-identified failure modes and other normal oper-
ation ODD excursions. Some smaller μODDs can be optimized for narrow but common 
special cases (e.g., 54-56 mph on a relatively flat dry divided highway). Other larger 
generic μODDs can be less optimized in exchange for reduced engineering effort (e.g., 
ice patches on a hill are likely to result in a cautious vehicle regardless of precise hill 
slope and posted speed limit). 
 
Figure 3. ODD subdivision and mapping onto safety envelopes. 
A way to implement a system using this approach is with an ego vehicle ODD mode 
state machine that transitions between μODD mode states depending upon estimated 
environmental conditions. An advantage to this approach is that it permits emphasizing 
engineering effort on the most-used and most important parts of the system operational 
space (e.g., typical road conditions) while being conservatively safe in unusual opera-
tional conditions that aren’t worthy of detailed engineering optimization effort. 
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5.2 Partitioning Criteria and Example 
Because each μODD has precisely specified boundaries, relevant aspects of safety 
within each μODD can be proven using RSS. Obviously this approach does not make 
uncertainty go away. But, what it does provide is a clean separation between provable 
system properties (RSS-based safety within an active μODD) and uncertainty (whether 
we have selected the correct μODD, which amounts to whether the actual environmen-
tal conditions fall within the specified bounds of the currently active μODD selection). 
While at first blush this approach might seem like it is just shuffling uncertainty 
around, we believe that it re-casts uncertainty into a form more amenable to application 
to real-world driving situations. That is because it accommodates both measurement 
uncertainty and modelling uncertainty such as prediction uncertainty. 
     Knowing that there are many vehicle and environmental parameters that can affect 
stopping ability, which parameter variations should inhabit separate μODDs and which 
should belong to the same μODD’s equivalence class? Here are some factors we think 
will be relevant: 
Effect on permissiveness: Fundamentally, the goal of μODDs is to preserve per-
missiveness where possible, meaning in this case optimizing for minimal dmin. Splitting 
a large μODD into multiple smaller ones is only useful if doing so will enable a sub-
stantively smaller dmin to be used for a commonly occurring real-world situation.  
Temporal stability: Some μODDs should be designed to assume relatively constant 
conditions, while others could conservatively anticipate possible change. For example, 
flat dry pavement likely to stay flat and dry based on map and weather data suggests 
creating a μODD accordingly. However, there should be a μODD accounting for the 
possibility of ice patches. (Whether this should be a conservative pure ice μODD or a 
more aggressive heterogeneous ice patch μODD is an engineering tradeoff – so long as 
there is some μODD defined that can cope with worst case ice.) The system may also 
pre-emptively switch before expected future changes, such as slowing down prior to 
driving over a bridge in near-freezing weather based on road map data and dropping 
temperature. Temporal variations can also include contextual information relevant to 
cautiousness. For example, if a World Cup match has just ended, the μODD could re-
flect an increased cautiousness for possible occluded pedestrians in the area surround-
ing the stadium. 
Observability: Separate μODDs are useful only when differing parameter values 
are generally observable or can be estimated with sufficiently low uncertainty. This 
might require vehicle activities to self-characterize, such as exercising brakes occasion-
ally to check that braking capability has not changed. (Significantly more work might 
need to be done in this area to achieve an appropriate balance of self-test overhead and 
instrumentation cost.) 
Accounting for external information: Defining μODDs that exploit external data 
such as data transmitted from infrastructure and other vehicles is likely to help optimize 
performance. Whether that data is valid has some uncertainty that should be dealt with 
by the μODD state transition logic. 
Figure 4 shows an illustrative example of μODD decomposition. In this case the 
system designer has elected to partition the ODD into non-uniform segments based on 
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estimated amin,brake, amax,brake values, with an expectation that narrower ranges are more 
common in practice. Each table cell has a dmin value computed based on the worst case 
for that cell. As can be seen, the safe following distance of more than half a kilometer 
for the ego vehicle on ice with a lead vehicle on a good road surface is impractical to 
enforce under more ordinary conditions. (In a practical system there would be multi-
dimensional partitioning for bins of vr, vf, and potentially other factors as well.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Example dmin in meters for example μODDs with varied amax,accel and amin,brake values. 
Conditions: vr=25, vf=25, amax,accel=0.3g, ρ=0.5 sec. 
Cells highlighted where the special case dmin prevails. 
Implementing a μODD safety feature according to Figure 4 would involve setting 
up a state machine that transitions between different cells in the table as conditions 
change. (Note that implicit in this table is an estimate of coefficient of friction that 
limits braking ability.)  
5.3 A Bayesian Approach To ODD State Transitions 
A purely mathematical approach using worst case bounding values might have been 
used instead of the μODD table illustrated in Figure 4 if all we cared about was braking 
force. However, the μODD technique additionally provides a way to account for prior 
expectations in the state transition engine. 
     Consider, for example, the question of how fast to go down an urban street next to 
a row of parked cars. There is a non-zero chance that a child will dart out into traffic, 
making it prudent to go below the posted speed limit in high risk situations. But if we 
treat every parked car as certain to be harboring a child waiting for the worst possible 
moment to jump out into the roadway, we’d have gridlock 24 hours a day. Instead, 
human drivers use their judgment (albeit imperfectly) based on context. 
We can formalize this approach using μODDs by incorporating Bayesian network-
style prior belief of risk into the state transition arcs. Figure 5 shows a simplified ex-
ample to give an idea of the principle involved. The idea is that the Bayesian prior belief 
of a child running into a roadway is low in the middle of the night, but medium if 
children are nearby in general. However, a general rule of thumb is that every ball roll-
ing into the street is likely to be followed by a heedless child (triggering a high prior 
belief of an emergent child), resulting in a transition to extremely low speed permis-
siveness. 
14    Koopman, Osyk & Weast      
 
Figure 5. Partial, simplified state transition diagram for urban+children situations. 
Similarly, freezing temperatures and recent precipitation should likely trigger a 
μODD which encodes the likelihood of scattered ice patches even if no ice has been 
observed on the road. Approaching a bridge in near-freezing weather should cause a 
transition to a μODD that can accommodate a “Caution: bridge freezes before road 
surface” scenario even if there is no direct information about the bridge road surface 
conditions. 
An additional benefit of this approach is that it enables a phased deployment ap-
proach of creating a baseline vehicle that can operate in a broad range of conditions in 
a very cautious manner. For example, vehicles might be limited to less than 20 kph in 
a wide variety of circumstances due to the ability of the vehicle to stop very quickly 
and the low lethality of pedestrian collisions in such circumstances. Over time, μODDs 
can be engineered and validated to provide increased permissiveness in specific cir-
cumstances, with the vehicle transitioning in and out of those permissive μODDs as 
conditions change. As this type of system matures its capabilities will increase in re-
sponse to optimizing common operational situations without sacrificing safety for those 
situations that have yet to be optimized. This could permit safe deployment more 
quickly than with a system that depends upon having taken every possible scenario into 
account to attain safety. 
It is recognized that a fully Bayesian approach would require a mathematical frame-
work for managing transitions. Providing that and fully elaborating a Bayesian network 
approach is left as future work. 
5.4 Taking advantage of helpful but not perfectly reliable data 
A common response to uncertainty of information is to improve information with ex-
ternal communication “vehicle-to-x” links such as V2V and V2I communications 
[Arena19]. Incorporating that information as factual data has numerous potential prob-
lems, including potential invalidity as well as how to ensure safety when there is no 
other available other vehicle or infrastructure to provide data. However, with a Bayes-
ian approach to μODD selection there is a natural way to treat this data. External data 
can be used to influence the prior belief as part of the μODD selection. Even map data, 
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which can be very good but perhaps imperfect, can be incorporated into such an ap-
proach. 
6 Conclusion 
An examination of RSS has validated the following distance equation for common sit-
uations and augmented that formula to handle a class of edge cases for potential colli-
sions that can happen during a braking event. A significant potential impediment to 
practical adoption of RSS is providing sufficient permissiveness while ensuring safety 
in extreme conditions such as icy roads and encountering clusters of outlier sensor data.  
To arrive at a practicable balance between safety and permissiveness, further engage-
ment with government and industry standards organizations is recommended. 
Rather than making everything probabilistic to handle uncertainty, we propose di-
viding an RSS-style safety function’s operation into two parts. First, a set of μODDs 
should be defined to segment the total ODD space into manageable pieces. Each μODD 
can be proven safe with permissiveness optimized for a defined range of bounded ve-
hicle and environmental values. If those values are violated, the system can switch to a 
different, more situation-appropriate μODD. Second, a Bayesian-style selection engine 
can be used to evaluate the prior probability of a set of conditions being true, and then 
selecting a μODD based on that belief. We believe that this approach will not only 
enable a reasonable deployment of RSS, but also provides a promising framework for 
dealing with situations such as how to moderate speed in areas that might have potential 
children at play and other context-dependent safety relevant vehicle behaviors. 
This research was supported by Intel. 
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Appendix: Detailed Analysis 
The analysis is broken up into two parts based on the situation at the time of a collision 
if following distance is violated: (1) the rear vehicle stops at a location past the stopping 
point of the front vehicle; and (2) the rear vehicle stops behind the front vehicle, but 
passes the position of the front vehicle for some fraction of time during the braking 
process. (In both cases the “passing” of the front vehicle has to do with the computed 
position in the absence of a collision.) Below is a more detailed derivation. 
All cases the original RSS equation avoids having a situation in which the rear ve-
hicle resting position would be in front of the front vehicle:  
𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �0, �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 + 12  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌2 + �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟+ 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎�2 2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓22𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 ��    (A.1) 
This minimum holds as a bound for all cases. However, the minimum might be larger 
to avoid a transient overlap in position that occurs during the stopping process (the 
special case). 
The relevant aspect of special case is an impact that occurs when both vehicles are 
moving. (If the front vehicle is stopped at time of impact, the RSS equation applies. If 
the rear vehicle is stopped there can be no impact.) 
Avoiding the special case impact requires first that the following distance account 
for the closing distance d’’ that is consumed during ρ based on the front vehicle decel-
erating and the rear vehicle accelerating at the same time. Again, vehicles must still be 
moving during the entire response time ρ to be worse than the original RSS equation. 
𝑑𝑑′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓�𝜌𝜌 + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝜌𝜌22   (A.2) 
 
For the special case to result in a collision d’’min must be non-negative, meaning that 
the rear vehicle must be catching up to the front vehicle during the response time. 
At the end of the response time the rear vehicle is going faster than or equal to the 
speed of the front vehicle (this is the special case, by definition). That means there needs 
to be enough remaining separation in addition to d’’min between the front and rear ve-
hicles for the rear vehicle to just barely catch up to, but not touch, the front vehicle as 
they both brake. This can be determined by solving for the closest point of approach 
after the response time. 
The distance of each vehicle is a function of time t relative to the end of the response 
time, taking into account velocity changes during the response time. Both vehicles must 
either be moving or have simultaneously stopped at the closest point of approach due 
to being at the same speed (see below). The distances they travel at time t are (note that 
t=0 is set at end of the response time for notational convenience): 
𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡22                              (A.3) 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡22                                   (A.4) 
 
The separation d’’’ between vehicles required to avoid a collision at time t is the 
amount travelled by the rear vehicle minus the amount travelled by the front vehicle 
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(i.e., the amount of encroachment of the rear vehicle upon the front vehicle since the 
end of the response time):  
 
𝑑𝑑′′′ =  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡22
− ��𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡22 � 
(A.5) 
 
Finding the maximum value of d’’’ over time t from the end of the response time to 
the time at which the rear vehicle has stopped determines the minimum permissible 
separation to avoid a collision (ironically, this must be given the name d’’’min because 
it is the minimum safe following distance consumed by that phase of the stopping 
event). In all situations for the special case d’’’min will be non-negative. 
A constraint on time t is that we want the speeds of two vehicles to be equal. (Con-
sider: if the rear vehicle is faster they are still closing; if the rear vehicle is slower the 
closest point of approach has already occurred, potentially at t=0, which is the end of 
the response time.) 
The front vehicle’s velocity, as a function of time, is: 
𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎(𝜌𝜌 +  𝑡𝑡) (A.6) 
 
This expands to: 
𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡  (A.7) 
 
Where vf0 is the velocity of the front vehicle at the start of the response time and vft 
is the velocity of the front vehicle at time t. 
The rear vehicle’s velocity, as a function of time, is: 
𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟0 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (A.8) 
 
Where vr0 is the velocity of the rear vehicle at the start of the response time and vrt 
is the velocity of the rear vehicle at time t. 
When these velocities are equal, we have: 
𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟0 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 =  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (A.9) 
 
Rearranging to solve for t: (𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟0 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0) + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌=  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 (A.10) 
 
𝑡𝑡 =  (𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟0 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓0) + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)𝜌𝜌(𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎)  (A.11) 
 
Note: amin,brake greater than amax,brake is a condition for being in the special case, so the 
denominator is always strictly greater than zero. 
20    Koopman, Osyk & Weast      
The value for t will be greater than or equal to zero due to the conditions imposed 
upon the special case. If t=0, d’’’ min will evaluate to zero, but d’’min still applies to avoid 
a collision during the response time (i.e., for t=0 the closest point of approach is at the 
exact end of the response time). 
Reiterating the requirements for the special case: 
• 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌 > 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌      (Rear vehicle faster than front ve-
hicle at end of response time) 
• 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 >  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎     (Rear vehicle braking capability greater than 
front vehicle braking) 
Now we can assemble the pieces to give a comprehensive solution to minimum fol-
lowing distance.             𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚, (𝑑𝑑′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑑𝑑′′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)]  ;  𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 4 𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚            ;  𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (𝑂𝑂𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)                (A.12) 
 
As a sanity check on these equations, it can be shown that Equation 12 the special 
case is equivalent to RSS for the timepoints when the front and rear vehicles reach rest 
positions.  For minimal separation at rest, the timepoint tstop,f is the stopping time of the 
front vehicle and tstop,r is the stopping time of the rear vehicle after the response time ρ. 
(The numerators of these equations are the speed at response time ρ, which is used in 
the computation of d’’min) 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑓𝑓 =  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎  (A.13) 
 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑟𝑟 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎  (A.14) 
 
 
In this minimal separation at rest case, substituting the values in Equations 13 and 
14 into Equation 12 produces the original RSS equation. 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =  𝑑𝑑′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑑𝑑′′′𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚    evaluated at tstop,f and tstop,r  (A.15) 
  
Autonomous Vehicles Meet the Physical World (Expanded)    21 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓�𝜌𝜌 + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠)𝜌𝜌22+ �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑒𝑒  −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑒𝑒22
− ��𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑓𝑓  
−  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑓𝑓22 � 
 
(A.16) 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =    �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓�𝜌𝜌 + (𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠)𝜌𝜌22+  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝜌𝜌� �𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 �          
−  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 2 �𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑂𝑂,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 �2
− ��𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌� �𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 �  
−  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠2  �𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝜌𝜌𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 �2�    
(A.17) 
  
  
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =    𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22 +  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22  +  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�2
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎   
−  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 2 �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌�𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎2 2
−
�𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓 −  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌�2
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎   + 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌+ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22    
 
 
(A.18) 
 
22    Koopman, Osyk & Weast      
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22 +  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22  +  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎     + 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎  
−   𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓2
𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 + 2𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌 − 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌2 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌+ 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22  − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌  
 
(A.19) 
 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 +  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22 +  �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎
−
𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓
22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎      +  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22  + 2𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌
− 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌2 −  𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22  − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓𝜌𝜌 
(A.20) 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟𝜌𝜌 +  𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌22 +   �𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 + 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜌𝜌�22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 − 𝑣𝑣𝑓𝑓22𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎   
 
(A.21) 
 
Equation A.21 matches the non-zero portion of the original RSS equation, shown in 
Equation A.1, confirming the sanity check. 
 
